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“Living Together” or Living 
Apart from Religious Freedoms? 
The European Court of Human 
Right’s Concept of “Living 
Together” and Its Impact on 
Religious Freedom 
Shelby L. Wade 
In the 2014 monumental court decision S.A.S. v. France, 
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the French law 
banning both burqas and niqabs in public spaces was justified. 
The Court based this justification on the concept of “living 
together,” stating this newly-created concept allowed limitations 
on certain rights, such as the freedom of religion. With this 
decision, the Court vacated precedent which used a balancing 
test to weigh exceptions, such as national security in very 
narrow situations, against the limitations on individual 
freedoms. The new “living together” test is extremely far-
fetched, vague, and controversial. This Note discusses the past 
precedential balancing test the Court followed prior to the 
decision in S.A.S., and why it is favored against the new “living 
together” justification. This Note also examines the potential 
disastrous impacts on personal freedoms the new test may 
cause, particularly in reference to new face-covering garment 
cases which may appear before the European Court of Human 
Rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 
Cleveland, Ohio, May 2018; B.J., Journalism and Political Science, 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, December 2014. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In December 2016, to thunderous applause during her re-election 
campaign for Chancellor, Angela Merkel called for a ban on Muslim 
full-face veils in Germany.1 Merkel declared that the veils are 
“contrary to integration,” and “not acceptable in our country.”2 
Merkel also described the importance of showing faces in 
communication between persons, which is “essential to our living 
together.” 3 
Merkel’s claims and potential policies seem contrary to 
international human rights law, such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ Article 9, which guarantees “the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion.”4 Merkel’s words, however, reflect a 
recent trend in European countries of instituting bans on Muslim 
face-coverings, such as the niqab and the burqa.5  
 
1. Lizzie Dearden, Angela Merkel calls for burqa ban ‘wherever legally 
possible’ in Germany, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 6, 2016, 12:00 GMT), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-burqa-
burka-ban-veils-angela-merkel-cdu-muslims-speech-refugee-crisis-
elections-term-vote-a7458536.html [https://perma.cc/G9T7-2JVB]. 
2. Id.  
3. Tara John, Angela Merkel, Seeking Re-Election, Calls for Burqa Ban, 
TIME (Dec. 6, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://time.com/4591678/angela-
merkel-burqa-ban-cdu-cinference/ [https://perma.cc/C627-UDDD]. 
4. Id.  
5. Id.  
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Headscarves and face-coverings play a significant role in both 
religious identity and self-expression for many members of the Muslim 
community. The niqab covers the entire body, head, and face with an 
opening left for the eyes.6 In contrast, the burqa is a full-body veil, 
which covers the wearer’s entire face and body with a mesh screen 
over the eyes.7 There are numerous styles of Islamic dress which 
reflect local traditions and different interpretations of Islamic law.8 
Some women do not wear anything that distinguishes them as 
Muslim, while others choose to wear the niqab and completely veil 
their bodies.  
The niqab and burqa are banned in numerous European 
countries, including France, Bulgaria, and Belgium.9 Other European 
countries have introduced bans to their respective legislative bodies.10 
Critics of the bans argue these types of laws not only breed 
Islamophobia, but also violate many aspects of fundamental freedoms, 
such as the freedom of religion and freedom of expression, granted by 
the European Convention on Human Rights.11 The classic 
justifications for the full-face veil bans often rely on security purposes, 
stating that the ban prevents anyone from being able to hide their 
identity in public.12 Other classic justifications revolve around 
promoting freedom and rights for women, for instance, French 
politicians who claim the bans protect the “gender equality” and 
“dignity” of women.13 
 
6. A Brief History of the Veil in Islam, FACING HISTORY AND OURSELVES, 
https://www.facinghistory.org/civic-dilemmas/brief-history-veil-islam 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/696V-HC9H].  
7. Id.  
8. Id.  
9. Siobhan Fenton, Bulgaria Imposes Burqa Ban – and Will Cut Benefits 
of Women Who Defy It, THE INDEPENDENT (Oct. 1 2016), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bulgaria-burka-ban-
benefits-cut-burkini-niqab-a7340601.html [https://perma.cc/9CBP-
GK52].  
10. The Islamic veil across Europe, BBC (Jan. 31, 2017),  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095 [hereinafter 
European Veil Laws] [https://perma.cc/5VXR-5QXL]. 
11. Ben McPartland, Burqa ban five years on- ‘We created a monster’, THE 
LOCAL (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.thelocal.fr/20151012/france-burqa-
ban-five-years-on-we-create-a-monster [https://perma.cc/8MZ2-95XK]; 
see also European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9-10, Nov. 4, 
1950, F-67075 Strasbourg cedex, www.echr.coe.int (lays out the specific 
rights of freedom of religion and expression that must be protected for 
all persons). 
12. Id. 
13. Angelique Chrisafis, France’s burqa ban: women are ‘effectively under 
house arrest’, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2011), 
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However, one of the most controversial, and potentially most 
influential justifications for the Muslim full-face veil bans did not 
come from politicians or officials of a country instituting a ban, but 
rather the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court” or 
“ECtHR”).14 In the 2014 European Court of Human Rights case 
S.A.S. v. France, the Court held that a France veil ban was justified 
based on “respect for the minimum requirements of life in society” or 
of “living together.”15 According to the Court, wearing a veil 
compromised the aspect of “living together” in a unified society as the 
face plays a role in social interaction.16 The newly-introduced concept 
of “living together” has been the subject of much criticism and 
debate, with even the dissenting judges in S.A.S. stating the 
proposition was “far fetched” and “vague.”17 
The Court recognized the idea of “living together” as a legitimate 
justification for limitations on rights guaranteed by the European 
Court of Human Rights.18 In some situations, “living together” should 
take precedence, including situations where national security could 
potentially be at stake, such as at a security check point.19 The 
national security justification is widely accepted, but applies only in 
narrow circumstances. More controversial and problematic is the 
extended reach of the “living together” justification sanctioned by the 
Court in S.A.S. With this ruling, the Court has expanded the breadth 
of full-face veil bans to any public place. This Note suggests that by 
broadening the scope of where religious garment bans can be 
implemented, the Court is setting a dangerous precedent where 
“living together” and assimilation are valued more than one’s 
freedom. This would be an unpredictable move that would have 
detrimental, long-lasting consequences in the realm of religious 
freedom. An unexplained, vague justification allows for countries to 
more frequently limit its citizens’ individual rights with 
underwhelming reasons. As a result, instead of offering a strong, 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/19/battle-for-the-burqa 
[https://perma.cc/NLJ2-7FXQ].  
14. See S.A.S. v. France, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 695 (dissent claims that there 
is no legitimate aim for the ban and the balance between protected 
rights and sacrificed rights is not correct). 
15. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ ¶ 116, 121.  
16. Maxim Ferschtman & Jonathan Birchall, Case Watch: ECHR Says 
“Living Together” Justifies Ban on Full-Face Veils, OPEN SOCIETY 
FOUNDATIONS (July 1, 2014), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ 
voices/case-watch-echr-says-living-together-justifies-ban-full-face-veils 
[https://perma.cc/9DSL-QK23].  
17. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at dissenting opinion ¶ 5. 
18. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ ¶ 121-22.  
19. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 139.  
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recognized justification such as national security, countries can 
institute bans for much simpler reasons - such as simply having a 
small barrier like a cloth over one’s face - to take precedence over 
one’s freedom of religion.  
In Part II, this Note will provide a background of current 
instituted and proposed European religious face-covering bans. Part 
III will discuss current human rights law, the specific Convention 
articles which grant the right of religious expression, and how these 
articles may be overlooked in a “living together” justification. Part IV 
of this note will discuss the precedential cases regarding religious 
expression, specifically religious clothing, as well as the quintessential 
case which introduced the concept of “living together”, S.A.S. v. 
France. Part V will discuss cases regarding full-face veils which are 
currently before the European Court of Human Rights. Part VI 
addresses the potential future effect the concept of “living together” 
may have on the cases before the Court. Finally, Part VII addresses 
the disastrous and troublesome future “living together” has 
introduced for the Court, unless changes, such as a re-introduction of 
a balancing test, are implemented.  
II.  CURRENT INSTITUTED AND PROPOSED 
EUROPEAN RELIGIOUS FACE-COVERING BANS.  
Religious face-covering bans are not a new concept in Europe with 
Bulgaria, Belgium, and France all having country-wide bans.20 Other 
countries have either proposed bans that will be instituted in the near 
future, or have instituted bans that were struck down by their 
domestic courts.21  
In April 2011, a French law, No. 2010-1192, was instituted, 
banning the burqa and the niqab from being worn in public.22 The law 
passed by a vote of 246 to 1 with about 100 abstentions.23 The goal of 
the law was to “prohibit the act of aiming to conceal the face in 
public.”24 The French law inflicts a fine of 150 euros, in addition to or 
instead of a citizenship course.25 If one forces a woman to wear a 
niqab or a burqa, the resulting punishment is a year in prison or a 
 
20. Fenton, supra note 9.  
21. European Veil Laws, supra note 10.  
22. Susan S. M. Edwards, No Burqas We’re French! The Wide Margin of 
Appreciation and the ECtHR Burqa Ruling, 26 DENNING L. J. 246, 248 
(2014). 
23. French Senate approves burqa ban, CNN (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/09/14/france.burqa.ban/ 
[https://perma.cc/4P5R-CZ2Z] [hereinafter French Senate]. 
24. Edwards, supra note 22, at 248.  
25. French Senate, supra note 23.  
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15,000 euro fine.26 Per data collected in 2015, 1,546 fines have been 
imposed under the French law.27 
Following France, in July 2011, Belgium instituted its own ban of 
the full Islamic veil in public.28 Offenders of Belgium’s law are 
punished with a 15 to 25 euro fine and a possibility of up to seven 
days in jail.29 In December 2012, the Belgian Constitutional Court 
upheld the ban.30 The court stated the ban did not violate 
fundamental rights because the ban did not cover places of worship.31 
Also, the court, while acknowledging that the ban interfered with the 
rights of the applicants who challenged the ban, accepted that the 
aims of the Belgium government were legitimate.32 These aims 
included public security and “living together” in society.33 
Bulgaria also enacted a veil ban in 2016. However, under 
Bulgaria’s ban, women not only face fines of up to 770 euros, but also 
a suspension of social security benefits.34  
In November 2016, the Dutch parliament approved plans for a 
partial burqa ban in places such as government buildings, schools, 
hospitals, and on public transportation.35 The ban would not apply to 
those wearing face-coverings on the street, but only for security 
reasons, or “in specific situations where it is essential for people to be 
 
26. Id.   
27. European Veil Laws, supra note 10.  
28. Belgian ban on full face veils comes into force, BBC (July 23, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14261921 
[https://perma.cc/L9J9-R4KU].  
29. Belgium’s lower house votes to ban burqa, CNN (April 30, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/29/belgium.burqa.ban/ 
[https://perma.cc/4R86-AQ8L]. 
30. Saïla Ouald Chaib, Belgian Constitutional Court says Ban on Face-
coverings does not violate Human Rights, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Dec. 
14, 2012), https://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/12/14/belgian-
constitutional-court-ban-on-face-coverings-does-not-violate-human-
rights/ [https://perma.cc/6G6N-T457]. 
31. Id.  
32. Id.  
33. Id.  
34. Fenton, supra note 9.  
35. Harriet Agerholm, Dutch parliament approves partial burqa ban in 
public places, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 29, 2016), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dutch-burqa-veil-
ban-holland-votes-for-partial-restrictions-some-public-places-
a7445656.html [https://perma.cc/UU8R-HZLY].  
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seen.”36 The ban would also outlaw all face-coverings, which would 
include both ski-masks and helmets.37  
Spain attempted to institute a nationwide ban on burqas in public 
places in 2010, but Spain’s Parliament rejected the proposal.38 In 
2013, the Spanish Supreme Court overturned a municipal ordinance 
banning the wearing of burqas as unconstitutional as it violated “the 
fundamental right to the exercise of the freedom of religion, which is 
guaranteed by the Spanish Constitution.”39 
In January 2017, Austria became the latest country to make a 
move toward a full-face veil ban.40 Austria’s Social Democratic and 
Austrian People’s parties outlined their view of Austria as an “open 
society that requires open communication.” In their view, “[f]ull-face 
veils in public places are the opposite of that and will be banned.”41 
The Austrian government wants to present the state in a “religiously 
neutral manner” and accordingly, banned all civil servants from 
wearing Islamic headscarves.42 
Public polls conducted in other European countries show a public 
backing of burqa and niqab bans.43 A poll conducted in Britain in 
August 2016 showed that 57 percent were in favor of a ban, and just 
25 percent disagreed with the idea of a veil ban.44 A poll conducted in 
Germany also in August 2016 found that 81 percent of Germans 
 
36. Agence France-Presse, Dutch cabinet approves partial ban on Islamic 
veil in public areas, THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/22/netherlands-islamic-
veil-niqab-ban-proposal-dutch-cabinet [https://perma.cc/8FEG-MQGA].   
37. Agerholm, supra note 35.  
38. Alan Clendenning & Harold Heckle, Spain parliament rejects burqa ban- 
for now, NBC NEWS (July 20, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
id/38332675/ns/world_news-europe/t/spain-parliament-rejects-burqa-
ban-now/ [https://perma.cc/9C7V-9MVN].  
39. Soeren Kern, Spain: Supreme Court Overturns Burqa Ban, GATESTONE 
INSTITUTE (March 4, 2013), https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/ 
3610/spain-burqa-ban [https://perma.cc/5L8H-XT3K].  
40. Laura Goehler & Angela Dewan, Austrian government moves to ban 
full-face veil, CNN (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/ 
01/31/europe/austria-face-veil-ban/ [https://perma.cc/ZL3M-83KT.].  
41. Id.  
42. Id.  
43. James Blitz, Poll Shows Support in Europe for Burqa Ban, THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/e0c0e732-
254d-11df-9cdb-00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/7HG5-2PH2]. 
44. Jon Stone, British public overwhelmingly support banning the Islamic 
burqa by two to one, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/islam-muslim-veil-
burka-ban-burkini-poll-uk-britain-france-a7218386.html 
[https://perma.cc/P63Y-XB76].  
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approved of either a ban on the burqa.45 Of this 81 percent, 51 
percent of Germans wanted to see a total ban on the burqa, while 
only 30 percent approved of a partial ban on the burqa.46 
III.  QUINESSENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND 
LIMITATIONS. 
Several of the core international human rights instruments 
contain protections against discrimination based on religion and allow 
the fundamental freedom of expression.47 Many of the countries who 
have either instituted or proposed full-face veil bans are signatories of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, and have ratified the 
Convention.48 While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not 
a legally binding document, it has heavily influenced the constitutions 
of many European nations.49 As such, European reverence of these 
important human rights instruments appears sanctimonious in light of 
the fact that the face-covering bans being enacted across Europe 
directly contradict many of their core tenants.  
The European Convention on Human Rights prohibits 
“discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, or 
association with a national minority, among other status.”50 The 
Convention also states that “the High Contracting Parties shall secure 
to everyone in their jurisdiction freedoms” such as “the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” relayed in Article 9 of 
the Convention.51 Also secured are the right “to manifest one’s 
 
45. Josh Lowe, Germans Back Burqa Ban, Poll Says, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 26, 
2016), http://www.newsweek.com/burqa-ban-germany-germans-poll-
burkini-angela-merkel-493775 [https://perma.cc/39M9-6PC8].  
46. Id.  
47. Emily Howie, Protecting the Human Right to Freedom of Expression in 
International Law, 20:1 INT’L J. OF SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY 12 
(2018).  
48. Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005, COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list//conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=eIfdVOaw;%20https:/
/www.britannica.com/topic/Universal-Declaration-of-Human-Rights 
[https://perma.cc/C5KN-LTJ9].  
49. Nancy Flowers, A Short History of Human Rights, UNIV. OF MINNESOTA 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-
1/short-history.html [https://perma.cc/GJ5M-492M] (last visited Feb. 
20, 2017).  
50. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter Convention on Human Rights].  
51. Id.  
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religion in worship, teaching, practice, and observation” and “the 
right to freedom of expression” which is contained in Article 10. 
The Human Rights Committee has specifically emphasized “that 
any specific regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public may 
involve a violation of a number of rights guaranteed by the [ICCPR] 
such as: article 26, on non-discrimination;… articles 18 and 19, when 
women are subjected to clothing requirements that are not in keeping 
with their religion or other right of self-expression; and, lastly, article 
27, when the clothing requirements conflict with the culture to which 
the woman can lay a claim.”52 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone 
is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration 
without distinction of any kind” such as race, color, sex, religion, 
etc.53 
Some noteworthy Articles of the Declaration include Article 7, 
which states “all are equal before the law and are entitled without 
discrimination to equal protection under the law.”54 It also states that 
“[a]ll are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in 
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination.”55 Article 8 states “[e]veryone has the right to an 
effective remedy by the tribunals for acts violating their fundamental 
rights granted by the constitution or law.”56 Article 18 declares that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion; and freedom, either alone or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship, and observance.”57 Lastly, Article 19 of the 
Declaration states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression.”58 
Most of the countries which have instituted or attempted to 
institute full-face veil bans have ratified both the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Most challenges to the full-face veil bans cite these 
fundamental human rights instruments.  
 
52. Human Rights Watch, Discrimination in the Name of Neutrality: 
Headscarf Bans for Teachers and Civil Servants in Germany, 
www.hrw.org, [https://perma.cc/RUX4-EU3W] (Feb. 26, 2009). 
53. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) at art. 2. [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. 
54. Id. 
55. Id.  
56. Id.  
57. Id.  
58. Id.  
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These main international human rights instruments show that 
individual freedoms are often innate and should not be disturbed.59 
However, these treaties permit limitations of these freedoms in certain 
situations. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights, 
states that the freedoms are subject to “limitations as are prescribed 
by law and necessary in a democratic society.”60 In addition, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights also allows limitations which 
“are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of others.”61 The 
limitations must also meet “the just requirements of morality, public 
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”62 
None of these limitations equate to “living together.” The most 
similar limitation, in which “living together” could potentially fall, is 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which allows a 
limitation for “the general welfare in a democratic society.”63 
However, general welfare generally refers to the ability of a 
government to provide basic necessities for its citizens, not to ensure a 
group of citizens removes a cloth covering from their face so 
socializing with others has no possible barrier.64 A government has no 
plausible way to ensure every single person in a country is 
comfortable at all times. By disallowing the burqa or niqab, a 
government may be making one group feel comfortable in socializing, 
while making those who regularly wear burqas or niqabs 
uncomfortable.  
In order to ensure there is not an abuse of these granted human 
rights, a balancing of interests can, and should occur. There are 
certain situations where national interests may override the granting 
of individual freedoms. However, this should be a very narrowed and 
specified category granted in rare, compelling circumstances. The 
approach the Court is taking - granting a ban with no narrow focus or 
intent - is an abuse of its discretion and of innate human rights.  
 
59. See Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy, STANFORD PHILOSOPHICAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (June 1, 2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-
social-political/ [https://perma.cc/GDN6-L5W9] (“Kant held that every 
rational being had both an innate right to freedom and a duty to enter 
into a civil condition governed by a social contract in order to realize 
and preserve that freedom.”). 
60. Convention on Human Rights, supra note 50, at art. 9.  
61. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 53, at art. 29.  
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See Definition of General Welfare, THE FREE DICTIONARY, (Mar. 18, 
2018), https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/General+Welfare 
[https://perma.cc/7GQR-BXL2] (defining the general welfare as 
government concern for the health, peace, and morality of its citizens).  
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IV.  PRECEDENTIAL CASES REGARDING RELIGIOUS 
EXPRESSION AND THE VACATION OF PRECEDENT 
IN S.A.S. V. FRANCE.  
Numerous cases regarding the display of religious symbols have 
been brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
particularly cases involving face and head coverings. Many cases 
invoke the fundamental freedoms of religion and expression granted 
by founding human rights instruments; however, many have failed to 
ensure freedom in wearing religious garments. There has been victory 
for religious freedom where the head-covering ban in question is not 
narrowly-tailored to a specific place, e.g. in a public.65 In these cases, 
the ban is often found too broad and is overruled.66 The decisions in 
these cases before the ECtHR often hinge on the specific location 
where the covering is being worn.67 Two such cases, Phull v France 
and El Morsli v France, involve religious coverings worn during 
security checks.68 The ECtHR heard both of these cases prior to 
France’s veil ban.  
Phull v. France was brought before a Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights in 2005.69 Phull was a practicing Sikh and 
was required to wear a turban. Phull complained that, when going 
through the security scanner at an airport, he was required to remove 
his turban.70 This was required even after Phull agreed to go through 
a walk-through scanner and to be checked with a hand-held detector. 
Phull claimed an infringement of his right to freedom under Article 9 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court; however, 
stated that safety checks are necessary to the public safety and was 
within the purview of Article 9.71 Thus, the Court stated that the 
 
65. Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2010).   
66. See id. (finding that the burqa ban was not narrowly defined).   
67. See id. (analyzing where the ban takes effect).  
68. Eur. Ct. H.R. Factsheet, Religious Symbols and Clothing (Dec. 2017), 
available at: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Religious_Symbols_ENG.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/WBK5-JDCB] [hereinafter Eur. Ct. H.R. Factsheet]. 
69. Hilary Khoury, S.A.S. v. France: The Full-Face Veil as a Threat to 
Public Safety and the Protection of Others, 23 TULANE J. OF INT’L. AND 
COMP. LAW 607, 612 (2015).  
70. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF 
MARGINALISED INDIVIDUALS AND MINORITIES IN NATIONAL CONTEXT 88 
(Dia Anagnostou & Evangelia Psychogiopoulou, eds., 2010).  
71. Khoury, supra note 69, at 612.  
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implementation of such bans in relation to safety checks was within 
the state’s reach to ensure public safety.72  
Similarly, El Morsli v. France, involved an Islamic woman who 
refused to remove her veil for purposes of an identity check at a 
Consulate.73 The applicant also complained of a violation of her right 
to freedom of religion, specifically Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.74 The European Court of Human 
Rights saw no reason for departing from the rationale in Phull 
regarding security checks.   
While both Phull and El Morsli focused specifically on the 
removal of religious garb for security purposes, broader reaching cases 
have also been brought before the ECtHR concerning the wearing of 
religious symbols or clothing in a public place. The first major case is 
Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey. The applicants in Ahmet Arslan 
are members of a religious group who were arrested for breaking two 
Turkish laws- one against wearing headgear and the other against 
wearing religious clothing in public, unless it is for religious 
ceremonies.75 The religious group required a turban, baggy pants, and 
a tunic to be worn, and the members to carry a stick.76 The applicants 
claimed that their conviction under the Turkish laws violated Article 
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.77 In the case, 
Turkey cited prevention of “acts of provocation, proselytism, and 
propaganda” to justify these regulations, but had no solid evidence of 
abuse.78 Furthermore, Turkey also claimed the broad restrictions were 
“necessary in a democratic society.”79 
The European Court of Human Rights found that the Turkish 
courts and laws did violate the applicants’ freedom of religion by 
limiting their expression of religion through their clothing.80 The 
 
72. Id.   
73. El Morsli v. France, App. No. 15585/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).  
74. El Morsli, App. No. 15585/06 Eur. Ct. H.R.. 
75. Conviction of Group for Wearing Religious Clothing Overturned by 
European Court of Human Rights, HARVARD INTL. L. J. (March 3, 
2010), http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/03/conviction-of-group-for-
wearing-religious-clothing-overturned-by-european-court-of-human-
rights/ [https://perma.cc/XR5U-X2F3] [hereinafter Conviction 
Overturned].  
76. Id.   
77. Id. 
78. Sally Pei, Unveiling Inequality: Burqa Bans and Nondiscrimination 
Jurisprudence at the European Court of Human Rights, 122 YALE L. J. 
1089, 1095 (2013).  
79. Id.   
80. Id.   
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European Court of Human Rights stated “that it might have accepted 
that strict maintenance of a secular system was important for 
Turkey’s democracy and public safety, but that Turkish judicial 
decisions at issue had failed to rely on that justification.”81 
Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the applicants “were 
punished for their religious dress in public areas open to all, versus 
public establishments where the state’s interest in religious neutrality 
might outweigh an individuals’ right to manifest his or her religion.”82 
Thus, the Court held that the ban applied too widely, contrasting to 
more the limited restrictions in Phull or El Morsli.83 
All of these previous cases involved challenges to either bans of 
certain religious wear or to being asked to remove a head covering. 
These cases in particular, Ahmet, have led to the reasoning behind 
one of the most influential cases regarding religious expression: S.A.S 
v. France. The decision in S.A.S. set forth the roadmap for future 
challenges to religious head-covering bans. S.A.S. v. France was the 
first individual complaint, regarding a nationwide full-face veil ban, to 
reach the European Court of Human Rights.84 
S.A.S. v. France involved a 24-year-old French citizen who 
brought a case at the European Court of Human Rights against 
France’s full-face veil law, no. 2010-1192.85 S.A.S, a practicing Sunni 
Muslim, was born in Pakistan, where it is customarily viewed as 
respectful for women to wear a full-veil in public. She did not wear a 
niqab in public at all times, but wished to be able to wear it when she 
chose to do so.86 S.A.S. did not claim to want to keep her niqab on at 
all times, nor was she pressured by her husband or any members of 
her family to wear her veil.87 S.A.S. also stated she would agree to 
show her face when requested for any necessary security checks.88 
S.A.S. claimed that the French law, which makes it illegal for 
anyone to cover their face in a public place, violated several articles in 
the European Convention on Human Rights,89 namely her right: 
against inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3), to respect for 
 
81. Conviction Overturned, supra note 75.  
82. Conviction Overturned, supra note 75.  
83. Conviction Overturned, supra note 75. 
84. Ilias Trispiotis, Two Interpretations of ‘Living Together’ in European 
Human Rights Law, 75 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 580, (2016).  
85. Sune Lægaard, Burqa Ban, Freedom of Religion and ‘Living Together’, 
16 HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW 203 (Sept. 2015).  
86. Trispiotis, supra note 45.  
87. Id. at 586.  
88. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 695 at ¶ 13.  
89. Lægaard, supra note 85, at 203. 
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private life (Article 8), to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
(Article 9), to freedom of expression (Article 10), and to freedom of 
association (Article 11), taken separately and together with Article 14 
of the Convention, which is the prohibition of discrimination.90 
The French government cited both public safety and “ensuring 
‘respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic 
society” as justification for the ban91 In the second aim, the French 
referred to three values - human dignity, gender equality, and the 
concept of “living together.”92 For the last concept, France argued 
that the ban was justified on the basis that “the voluntary and 
systematic concealment of the face is problematic because it is quite 
simply incompatible with the fundamental requirements of living 
together in French society.”93 The Court summarized France’s 
arguments as stating that “the face plays a significant role in human 
interaction: more so than any other part of the body, the face 
expresses the existence of the individual as a unique person…[t]he 
effect of concealing one’s face in public places is to break the social 
tie.”94 
The Court accepted that the ban raised an issue regarding the 
manifestation of one’s religion or beliefs, and accepted that the ban 
constituted a form of interference with the applicant’s rights; 
however, the ban was still surprisingly upheld.95  
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that public safety was a 
legitimate aim, as was the concept of “living together.”96 However, 
even though the Court acknowledged that a total ban in all public 
places was disproportionate in order to fulfill the public safety ground, 
the concept of living together still justified the total ban as 
proportionate.97 The Court upheld the ban because it was justified 
under French law based on the legitimate aim of “respect for the 
minimum requirements of life in society.”98 The Court stated that the 
“veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as 
 
90. Id. at 204.   
91. Jill Marshall, S.A.S. v France: Burqa Bans and the Control or 
Empowerment of Identities, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REVIEW 377, 381 
(April 2015). 
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93. Lægaard, supra note 85, at 204. 
94. Eva Brems, SAS v. France: A Reality Check, 25 NOTTINGHAM L. J. 58, 
67 (2016).  
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breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialization which 
makes living together easier.”99 
According to the Court, wearing a veil undermined the term 
“living together” as the face plays a significant role in social 
interaction.100 Thus, the concealment of the face is perceived as 
problematic because it breaches “the right of others to live in a space 
of socialization which makes living together easier.”101 A concealed 
face through the systematic wearing of a burqa or niqab, per the 
Court, “falls short of the minimum requirement of civility that is 
necessary for social interaction.”102 The Court reasoned that the full-
face veil ban was instituted to protect social interaction, essential to 
“pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.”103 The Court viewed 
“living together” as a necessary social need,  a need so important that 
it outweighed the right to wear a full-face veil in public.104 In 
balancing the interests at stake, the Court also cited the fact that 
women could still wear non-face-covering clothing, such as 
headscarves, and that the 150 Euro fine was small.105  
The murky justification behind the concept of “living together” 
did not persuade the dissenting judges, who called it “far fetched” and 
“vague.”106 Furthermore, the dissenting judges did not find that the 
majority had shown which precise rights of others could be inferred 
from this concept of “living together.”107 The dissenters acknowledged 
that the face is important to communication, but did not “lead to the 
conclusion that human interaction is impossible if the full face is not 
shown.” 108  In turn, they also expressed “that the individual rights 
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100. See Marshall, supra note 91, at 384 (discussing the holding of the 
European Court in S.A.S., in which it sided with the French 
government and its view of the importance of the face in social 
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102. Id. at 385. 
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fostered by the Convention should not give way to ‘abstract 
principles’ such as living together.”109  
Opponents of the ruling state that the “living together” holding 
given by the Court makes a “mockery of freedom of expression, 
religious or otherwise.”110 John Dalhuisen, the Europe and Central 
Asia Programme Director at Amnesty International, stated that with 
its ruling, the Court has declared that “discomfort and shock are the 
price democratic societies must pay precisely to enable ‘living 
together’.”111 The reality is that in forcing people to ‘live together’, 
this ruling will end up forcing a small minority to live apart, as it 
effectively obliges women to choose between expressing their religious 
beliefs and being in public.”112 
V.  WHAT EFFECT WILL “LIVING TOGETHER” 
HAVE ON POST- S.A.S. CASES?   
Following the 2014 controversial ruling in S.A.S. v. France, two 
other cases have recently been filed and are pending application 
before the Belgian government. These two cases, which have been 
ruled on, could potentially appear before the European Court of 
Human Rights on appeal.  
The first case, Belkacemi and Oussar v. Belgium involves two 
applicants fined for wearing a face-covering. One is a female Belgian 
national who was fined in Brussels in 2009 for violation of a municipal 
face-covering ban.113 She successfully challenged her fine before a 
police tribunal; however, due to the nationwide Belgian criminal ban, 
the applicant stated she stopped wearing the face veil because of the 
fear of being stopped by Belgian police, the stigmatization 
surrounding the law, and the possibility of fines.114 
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The second applicant in Belkacemi is a Moroccan national who 
lives in Belgium and was fined in Brussels in 2011.115 After the 
Belgian nationwide ban was adopted, the applicant refused to go out 
in public without her face veil, and instead stays at home. This 
decision due to fear of the ban has affected both her private and social 
life.116   
The applicants in Belkacemi filed a claim for the suspension and 
annulment of the burqa ban before the Belgian Constitutional Court 
on July 27, 2001.117 The applicants invoked articles of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in support of their claims, particularly 
the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8) the freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9), and the prohibition of 
discrimination (Article 14).118 On October 5, 2011, the Belgian 
Constitutional Court refused to suspend the effect of the challenged 
burqa act, as the applicants did not demonstrate that the application 
of the act during the proceedings caused serious irrevocable 
prejudice.119 Following this decision, subsequent actions were 
introduced by another Muslim woman, two non-Muslim people, and 
non-profit organizations.120 
The Constitutional Court then ruled on the actions for annulment 
of the burqa ban on December 6, 2012, holding that the Act “met the 
condition of foreseeability required by the Constitution and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.”121 The Court also held that 
the rights to freedom of expression, religion, and to private life are 
not absolute and limitations are allowed if found to be necessary in a 
democratic society.122 Furthermore, while the Court found the burqa 
 
115. See id. (discussing the second applicant in Belkacemi and Oussar v. 
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AND THE LAW 168 (Eva Brems, ed., 2014) (discussing the previous claim 
of Belkacemi and Oussar before the Belgian Court).  
118. Eur. Ct. H.R. Factsheet, supra note 68. 
119. See EMMANUELLE BRIBOSIA & ISABELLE RORIVE, REPORT ON MEASURES 
TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION 32 (European Network of Legal Experts in 
the Non-discrimination Field, 2013), http://www.refworld.org/ 
pdfid/540da8064.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY32-6E9W] (discussing the 
judgment of the Constitutional Court in the case brought by parties 
Belkacemi and Oussar).  
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ban interfered with religious freedom, the aims of the act were 
legitimate and proportionate.123 
Another important case questioning the Belgian burqa ban is 
Dakir v. Belgium. Dakir involves a Belgian woman and her complaint 
regarding both municipal and Belgium’s nationwide face-veil bans. 
Dakir was communicated to the Belgium on July 9, 2015.124The 
applicant invoked articles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in support of her claims, particularly the right to respect for 
private and family life (Article 8) the freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion (Article 9), and the freedom of expression (Article 10) 
both in isolation and in combination with the prohibition of 
discrimination (Article 14).125 The Human Rights Centre at Ghent 
University filed a third party intervention in Dakir.126 In their 
intervention, the Centre explored the differences between the French 
cases, such as S.A.S. v. France, and the Belgian cases.127  
The first major difference between the French and Belgian ban is 
that both the municipal and nationwide bans include fines, whether 
administrative or criminal fines.128 The second difference is that that 
Belgian ban, unlike the French ban, does not contain a provision that 
penalizes another person who forces another to cover her face.129 The 
last major difference between the French and Belgian bans is the 
process which led to the actual adoption of the bans. In France, the 
ban is looked at by a collection of expert opinions, and there is an 
inclusion of advice both on the legality of the ban and it’s conformity 
with human rights.130 France also includes discussion with both 
chambers of parliament.131 Belgian’s process of instituting the ban is 
much simpler and less engaged than the French process.  
While there is no record of a specific ruling on the Dakir case 
because the application is still pending, per precedential rulings by 
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the Belgian Constitutional Court, such as in Belkacemi and Oussar v. 
Belgium, the Belgian burqa ban will most likely be upheld.  
VI.  THE POTENTIAL AFFECT A JUSTIFICATION OF 
“LIVING TOGETHER” COULD HAVE ON FUTURE 
FACE-COVERING CASES BEFORE THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.  
While S.A.S. v. France cannot be appealed as it was handed 
down by the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber, future cases before the Court 
could still be affected by the S.A.S holding.132 
As the dissenting judges noted in S.A.S., the Court’s concept of 
“living together” is extremely vague and general.133 The Court did not 
take the extra step to clarify what actually constitutes “the rights and 
freedoms of others” which are outside the scope of rights protected by 
the Convention.134 With cases concerning similar full-face veil bans, 
the decisions may provide the Court with an opportunity to specify 
and narrow the meaning of “living together.”  
Furthermore, as countries have seen with the ruling in S.A.S., the 
concept of “living together” may be used as an effective justification 
for future bans that extend far beyond just face-coverings. As a result, 
there may be more cases concerning bans on other forms of religious 
expression seen by the Court where the government cites the “living 
together” justification. Also, as previously-mentioned, polls conducted 
in other European countries, such as Britain and Germany, show a 
shifting public opinion of approval of bans regarding full-face veils. 
This potential influx of cases may provide the Court with various 
opportunities to hopefully clarify what “living together” entails. 
In the event Belkacemi and Oussar v. Belgium and Dakir v. 
Belgium are brought before the Court, the concept of “living 
together” will most certainly be invoked as the basis for the respective 
Belgian ban. As the S.A.S. holding shows, other justifications, such as 
maintaining public safety and preventing gender discrimination, have 
been unpersuasive in the past and may be forgone entirely. Thus, 
more countries, such as Belgium, may capitalize on the justification of 
“living together” in defense of their bans, particularly for any appeals 
or cases brought before the Court.135 
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The introduction of “living together” in the S.A.S. is not 
completely random in light of France’s proud legacy as a secular 
nation or what is more commonly referred to as “laïcité.”136 Laïcité 
refers the freedom of citizens and public institutions from the 
influence of organized religion.137 It is based on the belief that France 
should ignore religious and ethnic differences, and instead promote a 
unified national identity.138 Thus, the Court looks to this portion of 
France’s national identity in introducing the concept of “living 
together” and in light of this, concluded it was a legitimate aim.139 
While this justification is traditionally a French concept, the 
Court, by introducing the notion of “living together,” may cause other 
countries to appropriate a distinctly French concept as well. This 
could have long-lasting effects on how bans are instituted and written 
in other countries. Furthermore, if a country is able to conform its 
ban to the concept of “living together,” the ban may be upheld, which 
would have been highly improbable under the Court’s pre-S.A.S. 
jurisprudence. Through the S.A.S. decision, the Court has declared 
that face-covering bans, regardless of whether they fly in the face of 
international human rights instruments guaranteeing citizens 
freedoms of religion and expression, can be justified simply because 
they conceal the face and making discussions apparently more 
difficult.  
The Court is also not accomplishing the goal of making it easier 
for ethnically and religiously diverse individuals to “live together.” By 
making socializing more comfortable for one side, the Court’s ruling 
may make the other individual, the one who wishes to wear a face-
covering, more uncomfortable. For example, in Belkacemi, the 
applicant refused to go out in public without her face veil, and instead 
stays at home.140 It would be extremely difficult for the Court to make 
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an impartial choice on who should have to endure their 
uncomfortableness.   
Courts, while not formally bound to follow previous judgments, 
“in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before 
the law” that the Court should follow precedents laid down in 
previously decided cases.141 Most likely, the Court will not overrule 
such a recent decision, regardless of how controversial that decision 
was.  
The ultimate deciding factor of whether “living together” will 
make on impact on future European Court of Human Rights cases is 
the justification employed by the government in defense of  their face-
covering ban. In this vein, if the government decides to go with a 
previously rejected justification – public safety or gender equality - 
the ban will most likely be overturned. However, a truly well-formed 
argument invoking the notion of “living together,” may succeed in 
light of S.A.S.  
VII. “LIVING TOGETHER” – A TROUBLESOME 
FUTURE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. 
The ECtHR’s intention behind “living together” could have 
certainly started out as a good faith attempt to strike a balance 
between widely-held public interests and individual religious freedoms 
in order to bring about broader societal harmony in Europe. Most of 
the bans are neutral provisions; they do not mention a specific 
religion.142 In an attempt to balance the aforementioned interests, the 
S.A.S. majority noted that France was seeking to protect “a principle 
of interaction between individuals” which the state views as “essential 
for the expression not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is not democratic society.”143  
The ban attempts to make living in a modern, multi-ethnic state 
more comfortable by taking away the “barrier” a burqa or niqab 
presents and to facilitate open communication. Proponents argued 
that the ban would “release women from the subservience of the full-
face veil” allowing them to belong to society.144 Some view the burqa 
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and niqab as “a tomb” for the women who wear it.145 Thus, by 
banning the burqa, supporters allege they are getting rid of the 
oppressive garment, which some Muslim women do not have a choice 
whether to wear.146 However, this view completely disregards those 
women, such as S.A.S. who independently choose to wear the burqa, 
with no external force.147 
The Court’s good-faith effort, however, does not ease the 
integration of Muslims into French society, but rather forces Muslims 
to assimilate to European culture. The Court’s ruling, which 
essentially states that those who wear religious coverings cannot “live 
together” with those of a different nationality is an absurd and 
potentially dangerous conclusion. Instead of protecting the individual 
freedoms enshrined in various human rights instruments, the Court 
instituted a new concept with no legal or moral justification. Instead 
of fostering immigration and community, the Court has chosen to 
force a minority to surrender to the preferences of the majority.  
Assimilation is a concept typically frowned upon. Assimilation 
reduces the diversity of cultures.148 Cultures are similar to works of 
art; similarly the loss of a culture can be a tragedy for the world as a 
whole, just as a lost work of art is mourned.149 Minority protections 
such as the Human Rights Committee’s Rights of Minorities exist to 
protect the survival of minority cultures.150 However, this ruling by 
the ECtHR undermines all of the protections groups such as the 
Human Rights Committee worked toward. By solidifying the idea of 
“living together” as a real, substantial argument, the court infringes 
these protections, and instead values cultural neutrality over personal 
religious expression.   
145. William Langley, France’s burka ban is a victory for tolerance, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/europe/france/8444177/BurkaFranceNational-FrontMarine-
Le-PenMuslimFadela-AmaraAndre-Gerinhijab.html 
[https://perma.cc/QGK8-FTCE]. 
146. See id. (“Large numbers of the women who wear the burka – whether in 
France, Britain or anywhere else – don’t have a choice.”). 
147. S.A.S. 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 11.  
148. See Michael Blake, Diversity, Survival, and Assimilation, 12 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 637, 650 (2001-2002) (“The price of acting to 
preserve a diversity of cultures, it seems, is that diversity within culture 
may thereby be withered.”). 
149. See generally id. at 642 (explaining the problems with assimilation).  
150. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 
27 (Rights of Minorities), at 1, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, General 
Comment No. 23 (April 8, 1994) http://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/453883fc0.html [https://perma.cc/5N5A-5893] (explaining that 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s establishes rights to minorities 
including the right to enjoy their own culture and to use their own 
language, among rights). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
“Living Together” or Living Apart from Religious Freedoms? 
433 
This is not to say that freedoms should always take precedence. 
There are certain circumstances where freedoms can be infringed for 
overwhelming interests, such as an actual, realized national security 
threat. The Court had arrived at this conclusion and used a type of 
balancing test prior to the S.A.S. ruling. In situations where the ban 
was narrowed and specific, like ensuring public safety in airports and 
Consulates, such as in Phull and El Morsli, often the state’s 
justification would overrule and override religious freedoms. However, 
when the ban was too broad, and the state could not limit it to a 
specific justification, such as in Ahmet Arslan, religious freedoms 
would win out. The ruling in S.A.S. destroyed any balancing system 
the Court had implemented prior. Instead, the Court threw out all of 
the precedential rulings it had set in place beforehand in favor of 
introducing and justifying “living together.” In the S.A.S. ruling, the 
ECtHR even stated that a total ban in all public places was 
disproportionate in order to fulfill the public safety ground; however, 
the concept of living together still justified the total ban as 
proportionate.151 
Therefore, instead of implementing a proportionate, fair balancing 
system which weighs the rights of both the individual and state, the 
Court introduced the catch-all “living together” which is heavily in 
favor of the state. A fair balancing test cannot be done with the 
concept of “living together” as the concept is so amorphous. Now, 
instead of community rights only trumping in some cases, and not 
others, with a well-phrased justification warranting an inclusive 
society, or preventing an interruption of communication, individual 
religious rights will continuously be impeded and obstructed by the 
Court.  
However, with its recent rulings, the Court does not seem keen to 
take this approach, but has instead extended its reach of “living 
together.” The case Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland involved 
the refusal of Muslim parents to send their daughters to send their 
daughters to their enrolled school’s mandatory mixed-sex swimming 
lessons.152 The school refused to grant the daughters an exception, and 
a case was brought by the parents of the two Muslim girls153 The 
ECtHR, while not specifically citing “living together”, again expressed 
this idea of assimilation over personal freedoms. The Court 
 
151. See Marshall, supra note 91 at 381-382 (“While a total ban was then 
analysed as disproportionate on the public safety ground, the majority 
concluded that the concept of living together justified a total ban as 
being proportionate and therefore ‘necessary in a democratic society’.”).  
152. Press Release, Eur. Ct. H.R. Osmanoǧlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland 
(Jan. 10, 2017) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-5592122-
7062572 [https://perma.cc/2KQ9-EPFB]. 
153. Id.  
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emphasized “that school played a special role in the process of social 
integration.”154 Thus, the children’s “successful social integration” 
took precedence over the “applicants’ private interest.”155  
While other analyses of S.A.S. v. France have suggested that the 
Court’s “living together” justification is unlikely to be used by the 
Court in future cases,156 this latest ruling proves the opposite. Instead 
of limiting the use of “living together,” the court has used an inclusive 
society as justification in realms outside of religious garments. This 
recent ruling should be worrisome; it shows that the Court will not 
only continue to justify “living together,” but broaden it to other 
areas than its initial use.  
The broadness may also cross over to other religious garments in 
other religions. Most of the uses and challenges which have appeared 
before the ECtHR involve Muslims and the niqab or burqa. However, 
there is nothing preventing this justification from being used against 
other displays of religious symbols; in the past, the ECtHR has heard 
cases on the visible display of cross necklaces.157 This was before the 
S.A.S. ruling; however, post-S.A.S., as long as a country could 
provide a vague “living together” justification, and a ban could be 
implemented.  
This is the extremely incorrect route for the Court to head. For 
fairness purposes, and to prevent one interest from superseding 
another, the Court needs to reintroduce a balancing test, as well as 
narrow down exactly what “living together” entails. Without 
discussion and guidelines, this overly broad and vague term may 
destroy all the work religious freedom activists have fought so hard to 
procure. Without a return to a balancing test, the bar to a 
justification that the Court will approve is substantially low, and 
states will use that to their advantage again and again.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The concept of “living together” as a fairly new concept, but is 
still significantly undeveloped. While the concept will play a huge role 
in the actual decision of future Court decisions, the decision itself may 
also allow a little insight into what the concept of “living together” 
actually means.  
 
154. Id.  
155. Id.  
156. See generally Weller, supra note 109, at 133-142 (citing France’s unique 
culture and the European Court of Human Rights’ lack of stare decisis 
as reasons why “living together” is unlikely to be used in future cases).  
157. British Airways Christian Employee Nadia Eweida Wins Case, BBC 
(Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-21025332  
[https://perma.cc/G636-PE5W]. 
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Another effect that remains to be seen is how the concept of 
“living together” will affect international human rights law. As the 
Court’s ruling in S.A.S. shows, while human rights are preached to be 
nearly irrevocable rights, there are certain justifications and reasoning 
which can outweigh these individual rights guaranteed. Whether 
continued rulings on the path of S.A.S. will have lasting effects on the 
protection of human rights in Europe will certainly be interesting to 
see.  
As the public opinion polls have shown, bans subjecting those 
who wear articles of religious expression, particularly burqas and 
niqabs may be on an increase.158 With an increased number of bans, it 
surely follows that an increased number of complaints will occur as 
well. This is an issue that could have profound consequences on the 
freedom of religious expressions, certainly in Europe. Most likely an 
issue like this may also extend outside of the range of burqas and 
niqabs, but affect other religions as well. If the Court does not make a 
stand, and narrow its definition of “living together,” many European 
citizens may have to learn how to live apart from their freedom of 
expression.  
 
 
158. See generally Stone, supra note 44 (“Research… found a huge proportion 
of the public had no qualms about telling women what to wear, with 57 
per cent in favour of a ban and just 25 per cent against.”); see also 
Lowe, supra note 45 (“The poll… found that 81 percent of Germans 
backed a full or partial ban on the burqa, a full-cover religious garment 
worn by some Muslim women.”). 
 
